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Evil as a Distortion of Communication: On Hegel’s 





The early Hegel’s conception of evil draws on a very different paradigm 
than the current philosophical discourse on evil and therefore challenges 
received assumptions and can give us fresh impulses. In this paper, I first 
present Hegel’s conception of evil through a close reading of the Jenaer 
Realphilosophie’s, prima facie, obscure claim that evil is the ’internal 
actual, absolute certainty of itself, the pure night of being for itself‘. Hegel 
discusses evil because he worries how Romanticism and the romantic 
ideal of authenticity impact the possibility of communication. I then 
develop the idea that evil is a distortion of communication. I argue that 
this account of evil helps us to distinguish between evil and mere moral 




Philosophical theories of evil are often shaped by what a theorist takes to be a paradigmatic 
case of evil. There are a number of reoccurring and influential paradigms of evil in the 
history of Western thought: Satan, a non-human source of seduction; the earthquake of 
Lisbon, a natural evil; Hitler, Stalin or famous serial killers, war criminals or psychopaths, 
the chief contemporary examples for moral evil. In the present paper, I focus on a 
conception of evil that is oriented on a paradigm of moral evil that differs notably from all 
these, namely, on a man named Friedrich Schlegel.  
What did Schlegel do? Was he a psychopath, a tyrant, a German Jack the Ripper or 
a war criminal? Far from it. Schlegel wrote novels and philosophical reflections in the form 
of fragments, as well as treatises on foreign languages and cultures. Due to its praise of 
romantic love and disregard for traditional conceptions of marriage, Schlegel’s most 
famous work, the novel Lucinde, was considered frivolous and scandalous at the time. 
However, this hardly warrants that we characterize its author as evil. Yet, Schlegel served 
as G W F Hegel’s paradigm of evil because of what he stood for: Romanticism and romantic 




1 That Schlegel’s Romanticism was the main target of Hegel’s conception of evil is well established 
in the literature, see for instance Otto Pöggeler, Hegels Kritik der Romantik (Bonn: Bouvier, 1956), pp. 







In the current paper, I explain why Hegel thinks Romanticism is evil. I then develop the 
theory of evil that underlies Hegel’s criticism of Romanticism, largely independently of its 
original target. My main focus in this paper is the idea that we can understand evil as a 
distortion of a form of communication. This is a novel account of evil in its own right and 
one that can shed light on the nature and sources of evil. Hegel’s conception of moral evil 
draws on a very different paradigm than current debates do and discussing Hegel can 
therefore challenge common assumptions and afford fresh impulses. In a first section, I 
briefly explain my main concepts and indicate in what sense I draw on Hegel’s works. In 
a second section, I explain the early Hegel’s conception of evil via a close textual reading. 
In a third section, I discuss the strengths of an account of evil as a distortion of 
communication. In a fourth section, I discuss two problems of this account.  
I should note that whilst I start from one of Hegel’s own characterizations of evil 
and draw on his idea that communication is an essential element of human existence, the 
idea that we can and should understand Hegel’s conception of evil as a distortion of 
communication is my own. Furthermore, I am ultimately interested in developing a novel 
account of evil. This account picks out an especially interesting kind of deficiency that is 
different from moral badness, and it helps us understand what the difference between evil 
and mere moral badness is and what is deficient about evil. In a final section, I will also 
concede that this account has shortcomings that are finally rooted in Hegel’s intriguing, 
and also bewildering, paradigm for evil. During my investigation, I take four things from 
Hegel. Firstly, his idea to see evil as an extreme form of subjectivism insofar as this 
subjectivism encourages agents to find normative content only within themselves and 
ignore social dimensions of normativity. Secondly, I will develop my account via a close 
reading of Hegel’s dense and challenging characterization of evil in the Jenaer 
Realphilosophie. Thirdly, I will draw on Hegel’s assumption that a specific form of 
communication is vital to human existence. Fourthly, in the last section, I will draw on a 
number of elements from the Phenomenology and Hegel’s developed system in order to 
address objections directed against the idea that evil can be understood as a distortion of 
communication. 
Since my investigation is ultimately not in the service of Hegel scholarship but of 
a better understanding evil, in particular of the idea that evil can be understood as a 
distortion of communication, I cannot do justice to Hegel’s notion of evil as part of his later, 
more developed system. Obviously, Hegel’s conception of evil is much richer than his brief 
characterization of evil in the Realphilosophie. In his later system it becomes apparent that 
evil is not a self-standing issue and it is not just a matter concerning the interaction between 
two (or more) individuals, but also of the interaction between individuals and the system 
 
 
193-194). See also EPR §140, 265 where Hegel calls romantic irony the ’supreme form‘ of the 
expression of subjectivity and considers it the final, and presumably most severe, form of evil. 
Schlegel does indeed stresses that irony is ‘arbitrary‘ (KA II:160.108) thus indicating that irony is for 
him a mere expression of subjectivity or of arbitrary preferences. I will say more about Hegel’s 
criticism of Schlegel at the end of sec.II. In what follows, I cite the Elements of the Philosophy of Right 
according to Hegel (1970) vol.7: EPR §paragraph, page. My translation follows Wood (1991). I cite 
Schlegel according to Behler (1979): KA volume:page.fragment. Translations, with occasional 
modifications, are from Frichow (1971). Translations from the Philosophische Lehrjahre in vol.18 are 
my own.  







as a whole. Evil arises when the individual mistakes itself to be the absolute and above the 
system. I will abstract from this since it would go beyond the scope of my paper. 
Furthermore, abstracting from the systematic context of evil also allows me to sidestep a 
number of objections often levelled against Hegel’s theory of evil, such as that Hegel's 
notion of evil aims at subsuming the individual under the system or under a collective2 or 
that an account, which conceives of evil as part of a rational system, thereby justifies or 
condones evil.3 These are not problems for my project of developing the idea that evil is a 





The conception of evil I will focus on is located in Hegel’s Jenaer Realphilosophie written in 
1805/06 and only published posthumously in 1931. The Realphilosophie was written at the 
same time as the Phenomenology of Mind. In this section, I briefly look at the Phenomenology, 
the much more prominent text of the two, in order to gain a better understanding of the 
background of Hegel’s thoughts at the time insofar as this will help us understand his 
notion of evil. Obviously, I cannot even attempt to do the Phenomenology justice here, given 
that its themes span from perception to self-consciousness, to social philosophy and 
philosophy of religion and history. In fact, I will focus on one single element in paragraph 
69 of the Phenomenology’s Preface, since this element is very illustrative of Hegel’s 
philosophical and ethical concerns at the time. Hegel here criticizes appeal to ’feeling, to 
an oracle dwelling within’4 or to immediate certainty as ’trampling the roots of humanity 
underfoot’5, i.e., as a severe violation of our human nature or of what we, as humans, are 
capable of and entitled to. Appeals to immediate certainty are supposed to stop a 
conversation as they are to function as instances of final justification that others cannot 




2 I will, however, show in sec.II and IV that we should not understand Hegel’s criticism of 
subjectivism as him denying the importance and normative standing of subjectivity.  
3 See Richard Bernstein, Radical Evil. A Philosophical Interrogation (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002), p. 
75. 
4 PoM §69, 64. The extreme form of the internal oracle is the beautiful soul, which Hegel discusses 
polemically towards the end of the Geist chapter (PoM §658, 483f.). In what follows, I cite the 
Phenomenology according to Hegel (1970.) vol.3: PoM §paragraph, page. My translation follows 
Pinkard (2013) with occasional modifications. 
5 PoM §69, 65. 
6 The person who appeals to immediacy supposes that he ’has spoken of final things against which 
nobody can object nor beyond which anything more can be demanded’ (PoM §69, 64). These final 
pronouncements can, for instance, take the form of appeals to ’the immediate revelation of the divine‘ 
(PoM §68, 63), as well as to one’s ‘heart’s innocence‘ and ’purity of conscience’ (§69, 64). All of these 
sources escape external scrutiny by others since they are only present within the person who appeals 
to them. Hegel, by contrast, demands that ‘the best’ may not be ‘hidden away in inwardness; the best 
was supposed to be drawn up out of that deep well and brought up to the light of day’ (PoM §69, 
64). See also PoM §10, 17f., §14, 20f. 







the nature [of humanity] to drive men to agreement with one another, and humanity’s 
existence lies only in the commonality of consciousness that has been brought about. 
The anti-human, the merely animalistic, consists in staying put in the sphere of feeling 
and in being able to communicate only by means of such feelings.7 
 
According to this passage, it is an important, maybe even essential, feature of human 
existence that we can interact in other ways than through appeal to immediate certainty. 
We can (and have to) provide reasons and justifications, and these reasons and 
justifications have to be accessible to others in the sense that they can understand and 
critically evaluate them. Giving and taking reasons serves to drive men (and women) to an 
agreement with each other, and this agreement is not the result of force, threat or deception 
but of insight into the merits and justification of a claim or position.8 
Hegel's concept of communication as something that is part of the nature of 
humanity and as something that is supposed to lead to a commonality of consciousness is 
a much more specific form of what we usually mean by ‘communication’. After all, 
communication that stays ’put in the sphere of feeling‘ is also communication, but not the 
kind that Hegel thinks deserves protection and philosophical attention. We can label the 
communication that lies in the nature of humanity ’communication in a rich sense‘. Hegel 
assumes that the root of humanity consists in striving for agreement (‘to drive men to 
agreement with one another‘). This agreement consists in a ’commonality of consciousness‘ 
that does not merely occur accidentally when two agents share the same feeling or inner 
voice, but ’that has been brought about‘, i.e., one that results from agents striving together 
for agreement via a mutual exchange of arguments. Communication in a rich sense 
requires reciprocity between agents engaged in communication with each other and this 
reciprocity is not merely the reciprocity of two agents communicating their feelings or 
subjective states to each other. ’Reciprocity‘ means that agents make normative claims or 
demands on each other, ask each other for justifications of these claims and demands and, 
in turn, are willing to support their claims and demands with reasons. Communicating 
agents are in principle willing to take others’ claims and demands into account. They either 
make these claims their own or provide reasons for why they reject them, and they are 
open to others’ replies.  
In what follows, I will argue that we can fruitfully understand evil as a disruption 
or distortion of communication in the rich sense just outlined. Whilst Hegel himself does 
not explicitly say this, I suggest that we use his claim about the root of humanity to 
understand why he objects to certain forms of subjectivism as evil. The reason for this is 
that his objection might otherwise appear mysterious, and to fuel long-standing concerns 
that Hegel is an anti-individualistic thinker who wants citizens to defer mindlessly to the 
 
 
7 PoM §69, 65. 
8 The central role communication plays for the Phenomenology also becomes apparent in Hegel’s 
various discussions of language the element in which the fulfilling sense is present (PoM §695, 510) 
and which can reveal what otherwise remains internal (PoM §696, 511). See also PoM §710-2, 518-21, 
§726ff., 528ff. In Martin Sticker, ‘Hegel und die Wurzel der Humanität’, Hegel Jahrbuch (forthcoming) 
I discuss in more detail Hegel’s notion that communication and striving for agreement is the nature 
of humanity. I show how this notion informs the entire Phenomenology but also criticize that Hegel 
fails to do justice to the phenomenon of rational disagreement as another essential feature of human 
communication. 







community or to state authority. Focus on the phenomenon of communication in a rich 
sense helps us to make sense of Hegel’s early conception of evil as well as allows us to 
explain why he saw something wrong with certain forms of subjectivism.  
Before I outline the Realphilosophie’s conception of evil in the next section, let me 
stress that I do not claim that evil is a disruption of communication in a sense other than in 
the rich sense I outlined. Communication is a broader phenomenon than the reciprocal 
exchange of reasons. Issuing orders and commands, certain expressions of politeness, 
discussing merely technical (non-normative) matters, etc. are all forms of communication, 
albeit not in the rich sense that, according to Hegel, is characteristic of human existence. 
Unless otherwise specified, I will mean by ’communication‘ communication in a rich sense. 
Communication, as I use the term, thus requires the possibility of an exchange of normative 
claims or that all agents involved in communication are, in principle, willing to take into 
account what others have to say and willing to make their normative claims their own if 
they find them convincing. ’Normative claims‘ here is intended as a somewhat clumsy 
catch all for that which is given and exchanged in communication in a rich sense: requests, 
demands, reasons, arguments, etc. 
To give a brief example of what I mean by communication in a rich sense as 
opposed to other communication: Imagine I order my employee to perform a task and she 
tells me that she will not do it because this is not part of her contractual obligations; it 
would require overtime work without pay; it is unfair that this chore once again rests with 
her, etc. We are communicating in a rich sense if I take her objections into account and 
either change my mind; or point out that in fact it is part of her contractual obligations (I 
acknowledge that the contract binds both her and me); I offer overtime pay (I acknowledge 
that making my employees work overtime require that I compensate them accordingly); I 
point out that in fact it is her turn to do it this time (I acknowledge that my orders must be 
fair). We do not communicate in a rich sense if I give her the order and then just walk back 
to my office and shut the door without listening to her; only engage with her objections on 
a superficial level; answer that I don’t want to hear any complaints; ask her why she must 
always complain.9 Communication in a rich sense allows for hierarchies and asymmetries 
but not for lack of rational engagement with others. I should also note that not everyone 
who (occasionally) refuses to communicate in the rich sense qualifies as evil. Only an agent 
who has made it the centre of her identity not to communicate in a rich sense does. 
Communication in a rich sense matters for my discussion for two reasons. Firstly, 
as I explained, Hegel himself acknowledges that there is something very significant about 
our ability to communicate with each other: it is part of the nature of humanity. 
Understanding evil as a disruption of communication thus offers an exegetically grounded 
way to revisit and reconsider Hegel’s conception of evil based on a concern that even those 
who do not buy into Hegel’s system can share. After all, that demanding and giving 
 
 
9 Of course, matters are potentially more complicated than I presented them. What if the task is 
clearly part of the contract, does not require overtime and it is the employee’s turn and she does 
complain every single time she has to do something? In this case, it might be appropriate to tell her 
to stop complaining, if I have in the past pointed out to her why something is her contractual duty, 
part of the normal work day, and under what conditions it is fair to give her the task, and if I was 
willing to listen to her objections then. Communication in a rich sense does not require that we have 
the same conversation over and over again.  







reasons and asking for justifications is something fundamentally human seems 
uncontentious. Secondly, one central aspect of communication is that it allows us to 
criticise other agents and even potentially to change their minds. According to my analysis, 
evil agents cannot be criticised in the same way as non-evil agents. There is (almost) 
nothing to be gained by criticising evil agents. Looking at how we can criticise agents will 





Hegel’s early account of evil, on which I focus, is largely neglected in the Hegel literature 
as well as in in the literature on evil. This is presumably due to its relative obscurity as well 
as because it stands in the shadow of Hegel’s more mature account of evil, which can be 
found, for instance, in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Furthermore, despite Hegel 
offering the densest possible characterization of his early conception of evil in the Jenaer 
Realphilosophie, he does almost nothing to develop it here. In what follows, I will use the 
Phenomenology to elucidate this dense characterization, since there are many parallels 
between the Realphilosophie and the Phenomenology. 
In the Jenaer Realphilosophie (JR) Hegel characterises moral evil as ’internal actual [ii], 
absolute certainty of itself [iii], the pure night [iv] of being for itself [i]’.10 In this section, I 
interpret and explain this dense characterization. 
[i] Being for itself: Being for itself is the subject of this account of evil. The other three 
components of the account are characteristics of a being for itself, which is evil. The context, 
as well as other passages, show that ’being for itself‘ here refers to an agent’s self-
consciousness.11 Evil is a property of self-conscious agents or, more precisely, of their 
attitudes towards themselves and of how they understand the normative authority of their 
selves.12 In what follows, I will simply speak of an evil agent, but strictly speaking evil 
pertains to the self-consciousness of this agent. An agent be characterized as evil if he has 
the following three characteristics.  
[ii] Internal actual: ’actual‘ [Wirklichkeit] for Hegel does not refer to what merely 
exists, but to the rational or justified part of what exists, as it is apparent form Hegel’s 
 
 
10 ‘innerliche Wirkliche, absolute Gewißheit seiner selbst, die reine Nacht des Fürsichseins‘. This 
characterization occurs in G. W. F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1968ff.), vol. 
8, p. 256 separated in two different margins. The edition G. Göhler, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 
Frühe politische Systeme (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1974), published two years before vol.8 of the 
Gesammelte Werke, puts it in the main text (p. 262) and as one sentence. In what follows, I will quote 
the Realphilosophie, according to Gesammelte Werke vol.8 and also provide the page numbers of the 
Göhler edition. JR translations are my own. 
11 Cf. PoM §186, 147: ’Self-consciousness is at first simple being-for-itself‘. The idea that evil is a 
property of self-consciousness is also maintained in Hegel’s later works – cf. EPR §139, 260f. 
12 The attribution of evil to agents, as opposed to actions or their outcomes, is further warranted by 
JR 250 margin/258. Treating evil as a property of something other than actions, e.g., of the character, 
the person, or the agent is a widely accepted view. Cf. for instance Claudia Card, The Atrocity 
Paradigm (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 22, Adam Morton, On Evil (New York: 
Routledge, 2004). Others, however, do consider evil a property of actions (see for instance Paul 
Formosa, ‘A Conception of Evil’, The Journal of Value Inquiry 42:2 (2008), pp. 217-239). 







famous Doppelsatz: ’What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational’.13 The first 
characteristic of an evil agent is that what is actual or rational and justified for him is 
internal. An evil agent takes what is internal to him, or subjective, as a source of justification 
of his actions. Hegel therefore also writes that evil is ’divided from the universal’.14 
In the preface of the Phenomenology, Hegel’s example for such an internal actual, is, as we 
have already seen, the ‘internal oracle’15, which he identifies with an agent’s immediate 
feeling that something is right. The problem with taking one’s immediate feeling that 
something is right as a source of justification is that the justificatory force of the immediate 
feeling depends on the presence of this immediate feeling within an agent. There is no way 
for an agent to rationally convince another agent to have or share this immediate feeling. 
An agent either has such a feeling or he does not.16 Anything an agent becomes convinced 
of as a result of arguments presented to her would not come as an immediate certainty. 
Appeals to one’s subjectivity can thus constitute appeals to immediacy and disrupt 
communication understood as an exchange of reasons and arguments. 
However, we should bear in mind that subjectivity for Hegel is a necessary 
moment of agency and a guiding principle specifically of modern societies. Justifying 
claims by appeal to one’s subjectivity is legitimate in many circumstances, such as in 
matters of taste and personal lifestyle choices. Hegel is primarily worried about the 
Romanticist ideal of authenticity since it overemphasizes the normative significance of 
subjectivity.17 
The kind of ’internal actual‘ that is problematic for Hegel is most clearly presented 
in the Phenomenology’s discussion of conscience.18 There Hegel identifies a determination 
by one’s internal law with determination by one’s ’singularity‘ [Einzelnheit]19 and 
’arbitrariness‘ [Willkür]20. Being determined by one’s internal law is for Hegel a violation 
of what is universally recognized.21 ’Singularity‘ refers to a source of supposed 
justification, such as idiosyncratic personal convictions that the agent is certain of 
immediately and which he cannot justify to others and yet refuses to give up. An agent’s 
singularity is private in the sense that other agents have no influence over what the content 
 
 
13 EPR Preface, 24. 
14 JR 249 margin/257. 
15 PoM §69, 64. 
16 PoM §69, 64f. 
17 The most extensive and recent defence of Hegel against the charge that he is an enemy of 
subjectivity is Dean Moyar, Hegel's Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). According to 
Moyar, Hegel’s political philosophy explicitly aims to make room for subjectivity. 
18 The tight connection between conscience and evil is maintained in Hegel’s later writings. Cf. EPR 
§139. Moyar, Hegel’s Conscience presents an elaborate argument that Hegel also envisioned a positive 
role for conscience. Whilst Hegel was dismissive of formal conscience, he ‘unambiguously defends a 
view of conscience that he calls ‘actual conscience’’ (Moyar, Hegel’s Conscience p. 72). 
19 The standard translation of ’Einzel(n)heit‘ is ‘individuality’. This is inadequate since it does not 
allow us to distinguish between ’Einzelheit‘ and ’Individualität‘. I will therefore use the more literal 
term ’singularity‘ as a translation of ’Einzel(n)heit’. 
20 Due to this arbitrariness conscience as a source of justification can, in principle, justify any action. 
Other agents therefore ’do not know whether this conscience is morally good or evil; or to an even 
greater degree, not only can they not know this, they must also take it to be evil‘ (PoM §649, 477f.). 
21 PoM §662, 486., cf. also JR 250 margin/258. 







of this singularity is, i.e., they cannot talk an agent out of something he finds within his 
singularity. Others’ normative claims are completely irrelevant to an agent’s singularity 
because these claims do not stem from this singularity and an agent’s singularity does not 
acknowledge any normative authority other than its own.  
Hegel believes that appeals to feeling of certainty, internal oracles, conscience and 
authenticity are appeals to one’s singularity. If they were more than appeals to one’s 
singularity then agents could and would be willing to justify their claims in a proper 
discursive form (as opposed to insisting on the immediate certainty of these claims). The 
following two components, [iii] and [iv], of Hegel’s account of evil specify an attitude of 
an agent towards his subjectivity, which leaves no room in an agent’s deliberations for 
external input (exclusivity) and which lets an agent attach absolute confidence to his own 
subjectivity (immediate certainty). This, Hegel believes, turns appeals to subjectivity into 
appeals to singularity.22  
[iii] Absolute certainty of itself: An evil agent attaches absolute credence to his 
subjectivity. For an evil agent, a normative claim is justified beyond doubt if it stems from 
his subjectivity. The agent is certain that his subjectivity cannot go wrong and can justify 
all kinds of claims, not only those regarding taste or personal lifestyle choice, i.e., for 
instance moral claims or claims concerning what he is entitled to. An agent is certain of 
claims if they feel right to her. This right feeling should be understood in a broad sense. The 
examples from the Phenomenology indicate that such a feeling can stem from a supposed 
divine command (internal oracle), supposed moral convictions (conscience), or other 
personal beliefs and goals. Feeling, in this sense, is everything that seems immediately 
correct or evident to the agent and that he thus believes without second-guessing and not 
based on other, intersubjectively shareable, evidence or reasons. 
[iv] Pure night: Following my reading of [i-iii] the metaphor of the pure night can 
be understood as referring to the attitude of an evil agent to sources of justification other 
than his subjectivity. A pure night is literally a night exhibiting nothing but the 
characteristic property of a night: darkness.23 This is an inhibition of vision that makes it 
impossible to gain information about the external world. It is a state in which an agent falls 
back on his internal actual because his access to what is external to him is inhibited. Insofar 
as an evil agent takes a normative claim to be justified, this justification cannot come from 
an external source but comes from the approval of his subjectivity. The evil agent does not 
consider anything as conferring normative standing other than the immediate conviction 
that something is right. 
Hegel also refers to evil as ’the pure knowledge of oneself‘ 24, i.e., as knowledge of 
nothing but one’s subjectivity. This claim is prima facie puzzling since self-knowledge is 
usually seen as something good and extremely important.25 Hegel’s remark makes sense if 
 
 
22 That evil is a specific attitude towards one’s subjectivity is also maintained in Hegel’s more mature 
writings. Cf. EPR §139, 260-1. Hegel thinks that it is a specifically modern form of evil when 
’subjectivity declares itself absolute‘ (EPR §140, 265). 
23 In JR 252 margin/260 Hegel calls evil ‘this darkness of man in itself’. 
24 JR 252 margin/260. 
25 Hegel even calls the command to know thyself an ’absolute command‘ (Enz §377, 9). I cite the 
Encyclopedia according to Hegel (1970) vol.10: Enz §paragraph, page. Translations are my own. 
 







we understand it not as a warning against knowing oneself, but as a warning against 
knowing nothing but oneself or against failing to engage and communicate with other 
agents and learning about them (their views, projects, claims, etc.). 
Evil, according to Hegel, should be understood as a property of a self-conscious 
agent [i], who takes her subjectivity to be a source of justification [ii] of a specific kind. An 
evil agent rests sure in her arbitrary convictions (immediate certainty) [iii] and other agents 
as well as institutions and the community lack means to correct or rationally influence this 
agent and to provide normative input into her deliberations (exclusivity) [iv]. This agent is 
not merely someone who values her subjectivity, after all subjectivity has its rightful place, 
but someone who is obsessed with her singularity, i.e., with a supposed source of 
normative claims that is beyond rational criticism and the claims of which cannot be 
justified to others. Evil is the inability of stepping out of oneself and of seeing oneself from 
another perspective, which one acknowledges as rational or normative. Evil can be 
understood as a disruption of communication because an evil agent does not take the 
normative claims of others into account and does not respond to them as normative claims, 
i.e., as potential reasons to change his mind. An exchange of normative claims with such an 
agent is not possible. Other agents cannot function as a corrective for this agent and this is 
what makes his views and goals potentially so dangerous. Evil agents do not accept any 
externally imposed limits.26  
Before we move on to a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the notion 
of evil as a disruption of communication let me briefly say something about Hegel’s 
paradigm for evil, Friedrich Schlegel. I believe that Hegel does present a serious challenge 
to the ideal of authenticity, insofar as this ideal expresses purely subjective preferences, 
and as long as there is no need to justify oneself to others in an authentic life. However, 
Romanticism cannot be reduced to this ideal. This is particularly apparent for Schlegel 
himself. The truly ironic person is more distanced from the concrete features of her 
subjectivity than the evil person is according to Hegel. For her, her power to set ends is 
more fundamental than whatever those ends happen to be and she is well aware of the 
contingency of each end, even from her own point of view.27 
The consensus in the Romanticism literature on the dispute between Hegel and 
Schlegel is that Hegel got Schlegel ’badly wrong’28 and that he misreads Schlegel as a pure 
subjectivist and irresponsible free thinker.29 Schlegel is not an anti-systematic thinker who 
 
 
26 Of course, agents who do accept external limits can still be very bad. After all, the limits might be 
unjustified (for instance deferring to a Führer might be an appeal to external limits). It should also be 
noted that some supposed appeals to external limits, such as divine command, are for Hegel better 
understood not as appeals to external limits but as appeals to an internal oracle. 
27 I am grateful to Seiriol Morgan and Nadine Köhne for pressing me to distinguish between irony 
and authenticity as possible targets of Hegel’s criticism. 
28 Judith Norman, ‘Squaring the Romantic Circle’, Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America 14 (2000), 
pp. 131-144, at p. 131. 
29 Frederick, Beiser, The Romantic Imperative. The Concept of Early German Romanticism (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 2 stresses that it was the goal of Romanticism to ’reconcile 
the demands of community and those of individual liberty‘ not to deny any role to society. 
Furthermore, he argues that Schlegel endorsed romanticism chiefly because of its (anti-Fichtean) 
‘antifoundationalism’ (ibid.108). Schlegel, indeed, stresses that philosophical principles ’are always 
in a plural‘, and he criticises the ’foundation-mad‘ philosophers such as Fichte (KA XVIII:105.910, see 







wants to surrender philosophy, society and life-choices to arbitrariness, subjectivity or 
one’s singularity.30 For Schlegel ‘Philosophy is the real homeland of irony’, since ‘wherever 
philosophy appears in oral or written dialogues […] there irony should be asked for and 
provided’.31 Irony here is not supposed to function as an appeal to immediacy but rather 
as something that fosters dialogue among rational agents.32 Schlegel even claims that 
’Doing philosophy means searching for omniscience together’.33  
Hegel’s conception of evil might not fly as a criticism of early Romanticism, given 
that the Romantics are not necessarily committed to the unchecked subjectivity Hegel 
makes the target of his conception of evil. However, this still leaves us with the question 
of whether Hegel presents an interesting conception of evil that helps us understand the 
phenomenon. In what follows, I discuss the idea that evil is a distortion of communication, 
which I suggested is a fruitful way of understanding Hegel’s conception of evil and 





The conception of evil I developed in the previous section has the potential to give us a 
neat distinction between evil and moral badness. This is important, because, according to 
a wide-spread intuition, evil is different from mere moral badness.34 A philosophical 
 
 
also KA XVIII:518.16). Hegel himself was an anti-foundationalist, as becomes apparent in his critical 
discussion of Reinhold’s ’Grundsatzphilosophie‘ in PoM §19, 20, §24, 27f. Hegel thus presumably 
shared at least some of the concerns that led Schlegel to endorse Romanticism. For further defence of 
romantic irony against Hegel see Norman, ‘Squaring the Romantic Circle’, and Martin Sticker and 
Daniel Wenz, ‘System und Systemkritik – Witz und Ironie als philosophische Methode beim frühen 
Friedrich Schlegel’, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 120:1 (2013), pp. 64-81, sec.2.  
30 See for instance KA II:173.53. 
31 KA II:152.42. 
32 In his critical discussion of irony, Hegel distinguishes between Plato’s conception of irony as a way 
to engage others in dialogue and Schlegel’s romantic iron. He takes no issue with the former and 
only sees the latter as something that is intended as an attempt to present an ultimate justification 
(‘the ultimate factor‘) in the form of appeals to one’s subjectivity (EPR §140, 277). It seems, however, 
that Schlegel’s conception of irony might rather fit the bill of platonic irony than Hegel’s conception 
of romantic irony. See Bärbel Frischmann, Vom transzendentalen zum frühromantischen Idealismus. J.G. 
Fichte und Fr. Schlegel (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005), p. 332 for a conception of irony according to 
which irony is a personal ideal of self-perfection and self-distance, not simply an expression of 
arbitrariness. In the literature many authors concur that Schlegel was no anti-systematic thinker who 
advocated unchecked subjectivism and arbitrariness, but rather someone who championed a distinct 
form of dialectic. See for instance, Mandfred Frank, ‘Philosophische Grundlagen der Frühromantik’, 
Athenäum, 4 (1994), pp.37-130, at pp. 126-30, Rüdiger Bubner, ‘Zur Dialektischen Bedeutung 
romantischer Ironie’, in Innovationen des Idealismus, edited by Rüdiger Bubner (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), pp. 152-163, Sticker, Wenz, ‘System und Systemkritik’. 
33 KA XVIII:515.97, see also KA II:160.108. 
34 Paul Formosa, ‘Evils, Wrongs and Dignity: How to Test a Theory of Evil’, The Journal of Value 
Inquiry 47:3 (2013), pp. 235-253 for instance argues that evil is “a different moral category” than mere 
badness. See also John Kekes, Facing Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 49, Susan 
Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought. An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton 







conception of evil should be able to explain how evil differs from mere badness or wrong-
doing.  
We can understand how evil as a distortion of communication captures this 
difference if we look at deliberation. Morally bad agents tend to accord an undue weight to 
certain normative claims, usually their own, sometimes also claims of members of their 
gang or criminal organisation, members of the same race, gender, etc.35, and they act based 
on their biased deliberations.36 This, however, does not mean that they attach no weight to 
normative claims of others. Even a morally bad agent recognizes that others’ claims as well 
as universally recognized norms count for something, even if these do not stem from their 
own subjectivity. An evil agent, by contrast, never takes into account normative claims 
from sources other than his subjectivity. The evil agent does not attach a special weight to 
his own normative claims; rather, he attaches no weight at all to other claims. These other 
claims do not enter his deliberation. The evil agent is not biased but fundamentally 
ignorant.37 
This way to distinguish between bad and evil has three implications: 
(i) The morally good and the morally bad agent have in common that their 
deliberations are complex. The morally bad agent takes into account claims justified by a 
wide range of sources and has to rank these claims or weigh them against each other. His 
deliberations work like the deliberations of the morally good agent except that he commits 
occasional or frequent mistakes in the weighing of different claims against each other. The 
normative deliberations of the evil agent, by contrast, are simple since he only takes into 
account claims from one source. The evil agent does not worry about questions of 
commensurability, such as what weight to attach to his self-interest, needs of others, special 
obligations to loved ones, universally recognized norms, rights, etc. His deliberations are 
simply determined by his singularity. Whatever he is immediately certain of, what feels 
right to him, he takes as sufficiently justified no matter what. It might therefore even be 
 
 
University Press, 2002), p. 8., Roy Perrett, ‘Evil and Human Nature’, The Monist 85:2 (2002), pp. 304-
19, at pp. 304-305 for the distinction between evil and moral badness. 
35 There are of course many difficult issues here, such as: Is it undue to attach more weight to the 
claims of loved ones? Answering this question presupposes a detailed discussion of the moral status 
of personal relationships, which I cannot embark on here. Furthermore, I do not claim that agents are 
either morally bad or morally good – this would be a very ‘unhegelian’ dichotomy. A clear case of a 
morally bad agent is someone whose actions are always shaped by her conviction that she counts for 
more than others. Many actual agents deserve a more nuanced characterisation. 
36 Of course, this is just one kind of moral badness. Another prominent one would be weakness of 
will – an agent reaches an unbiased judgment but is then overwhelmed by passions and acts against 
his own judgment. I will focus on moral badness as it manifests itself in deliberation so as to clearly 
contrast badness with evil. 
37 That evil agents exhibit a ’total failure to see that certain considerations are reasons at all‘ is 
sometimes called ’psychological silencing‘ (Eve Garrard, ‘Evil as an Explanatory Concept’, The Monist 
85:2 (2002), pp. 320–336, at pp. 329-330). Things that otherwise would constitute reasons, such as 
‘[t]he sufferings of his victims, along with other considerations such as their rights, play no part in 
[the evil agent’s] practical deliberations. They count for nothing at all. And it is this silencing, this 
inability to hear the victims’ screams as significant, that accounts for the peculiar horror that we feel 
when we contemplate these evil acts and their agents‘ (Eve Garrard, ‘The Nature of Evil’, Philosophical 
Explorations 1:1 (1998), pp. 43–60, at pp. 53–4). 







incorrect to say that the evil agent deliberates, if by ’deliberate‘ we mean a weighing of 
pros and cons. The evil agent rather listens to himself until he becomes certain of something 
without engaging in critical deliberation in the normal sense. One of the attractions that 
being evil has for evil agents is that it makes decisions very simple and seemingly allows 
agents to sidestep many difficult issues.38 One of the characteristics of evil that evil as a 
distortion of communication successfully captures is that evil can result from, or be 
accompanied by, a form of thoughtlessness or overly simplistic worldview that is ignorant 
of important aspects that are obvious to everyone but the evil agent.  
(ii) We can communicate (in a rich sense) with bad agents but not with evil ones. A 
bad agent will take the claims we articulate to him into account – although often not to the 
extent that he should. We can argue with a bad agent, try to show him that he has attached 
an undue weight to certain claims, and point out why he should not have done so. The bad 
agent will then either admit his mistake, or, more likely, deny that he attached an undue 
weight, or try to justify his way of deliberating and acting to others. An exchange of 
normative claims with the bad agent is possible, he is willing to enter the process of reason-
giving-and-taking. The evil agent, however, sees no need to enter this process or to take 
objections into account. The only way for such an agent to be criticised by other agents is 
when the claims of other agents happen to correlate with claims that also have the backing 
of the evil agent’s singularity. Whether they do, however, is a matter of pure chance, and 
is independent of how good the respective claims are justified from an objective or 
intersubjective perspective. The conception of evil as distortion of communication does 
capture that evil is often not just a matter of great harm but inflicted by people who cannot 
be swayed by rational argument or by anything the victims of evil or anyone else could 
say. 
It is still possible, though, to criticise an evil agent internally by taking his own 
claims and beliefs for granted and pointing out internal inconsistencies – if there are indeed 
inconsistencies.39 The possibility of criticising the evil agent internally, however, is not 
sufficient to constitute communication. Internal criticism can, at most, bring the agent to 
exchange one of his idiosyncratic beliefs for another. This means that occasionally we will 
get the impression that an evil agent reacts to us in the right way, i.e., that he takes our 
claims into account, but in fact he is still determined by his singularity. I will say more 
about this below (sec.IV.i) when I discuss the difference between evil and insanity.  
 
 
38 Of course, there could be marginal cases: Take an agent who does extreme harm to others for a 
trivial personal gain but would not have inflicted the harm if the expected gain was just a little more 
trivial than it already was. Such an agent does acknowledge others’ rights and claims but assigns 
such a minimal weight to them that he collapses the distinction between moral badness and evil. I 
am open to that. In fact, Hegel’s problem is rather that there is too much divergence between evil and 
moral badness than too little (see sec.IV.ii). I am grateful to Seiriol Morgan for raising this point. 
39 It might also sometimes be appropriate to criticise evil agents from an external perspective not 
because we can hope that the evil agent will change her mind or even respond to us, but in order to 
demonstrate to a third party that a certain form of behaving is not on. I am grateful to Seiriol Morgan 
for alerting me to this point. 







(iii) Evil as a distortion of communication also accommodates the wide-spread intuition 
that evil agents, in contrast to morally bad ones, cannot feel shame or remorse.40 An evil 
agent does not understand that anything he did, said or believed, was objectionable 
because it was unobjectionable to him and nothing else matters to him. He sees no need to 
reconsider his position in the light of the normative claims of other agents, because he sees 





I will now discuss the two main problems of the Hegelian account of evil I developed. 
These problems are (i) that it might look as if the evil person is insane rather than evil, and 
(ii) that ’evil‘ might be a stark exaggeration as a label for the deficiency the account 
captures. I do not think that Hegel has the resources to give a completely satisfying 
response to the latter objection. Nonetheless, I believe that discussing these objections does 
not only reveal weaknesses of Hegel’s theory of evil but also some important features for 
our theorizing about evil. Before I discuss these objections, I will briefly address one other 
issue. 
From what I argued so far one might get the impression that Hegel’s theory of evil 
denies something that is (almost) trivially true. Isn’t it obviously the case that all claims we 
take to be valid or action guiding for us are claims that we also subjectively approve of? 
When Hegel worries about agents who only take into account that which stems from their 
subjectivity, is he implying that agents can take into account claims their subjectivity does 
not approve of, and even that they should do so? Surely, this cannot be required of agents. 
It is clear for Hegel that for a claim to be normative for a (modern) individual, this 
individual herself must accept the claim. This acceptance, however, does not have to be the 
approval of the agent’s singularity. Evil means that we accept claims as beyond doubt 
because our singularity approves of them in the sense that they feel immediately right 
(immediate certainty) and that we do not accept anything else and do not have any doubts 
about them (exclusivity). However, it is not the case that everything we subjectively accept 
is immediately certain to us, nor is everything we accept ultimately rooted in private and 
idiosyncratic ideas that we cannot justify to others. Evil is a specific attitude that agents 
have towards themselves and we can be subjectively convinced of something without 
taking up this attitude. Furthermore, often we are aware that what we believe could be 
false and we are aware of reasons that count against our beliefs, but yet we take these 
beliefs to be, on balance, better justified than competing beliefs. Such an attitude of 
accepting something cautiously and on balance is alien to an evil agent. 
Let us now turn to the two deeper problems. (i) It seems that an evil agent on the 
conception of evil as distortion of communication is completely caught up in her own 
system of idiosyncratic beliefs and is unable to be corrected by others. The medical term 
for such an agent would presumably be ’insane‘. This is a problem for two reasons. Firstly, 
’evil‘ might be a superfluous concept if it is merely a different word for a psychological or 
 
 
40 Cf. also Perrett, ‘Evil and Human Nature’, p. 304 and Brian Barry, ‘Extremity of Vice and the 
Character of Evil’, Journal of Philosophical Research, 35 (2010), pp. 25-42, at p. 30 who stress this element 
of evil. 







pathological condition. Secondly, insane people are commonly considered unaccountable 
for their deeds. It would be odd if evil got agents, morally and legally, of the hook. 
Let me begin my response with two remarks: Firstly, the proximity between ’evil” 
and ’insane‘ might not be coincidental for Hegel, given the target he has in mind. Some of 
the Romantics he criticised, such as Hölderlin, struggled with mental illness41, and many 
of them were very interested in phenomena, such as mental illness, depression, suicide, 
etc. Hegel calls madness (‘Verrücktheit‘) the reign of the ’evil genius of man‘ [‘böse Genius 
des Menschen’].42 Clearly, he thought that evil and insanity overlap at least partly. 
Secondly, it might be unfair to press Hegel or Hegelian theories of evil too hard here, given 
that the problem that there is no clear-cut distinction between evil and insanity is not just 
a problem for these theories but rather is rooted in the very phenomenon. It seems that 
many paradigms of evil agents, such as Hitler, Stalin, serial killers, could also serve as 
paradigms for forms of mentally illness. In fact, many paradigms of moral evil have been 
studied by psychologists because of their (alleged or real) mental illnesses.  
Still, this leaves us with the question of what the difference might be between evil 
and insanity. We can draw a distinction by looking at how we can and cannot criticise evil 
and insane persons respectively. Non-evil agents (good and bad ones) can be criticised 
internally as well as externally. As I already argued, evil agents can still be subject to 
internal criticism (sec.III.i) in the sense that such a form of criticism could change an evil 
agent’s mind. Insane people, by contrast, are not even susceptible to internal criticism. They 
are not susceptible to criticism at all. Insanity means that a person is so completely caught 
in her own web of beliefs that the web is even resistant to the charge of internal 
contradiction. A truly insane person either does not worry about contradictions43 or, when 
an internal contradiction is pointed out to her, she does not see this as a problem for 
retaining her beliefs, since she will simply make up ad hoc assumptions and explanations 
to smooth over the internal tension. With an evil agent I can only discuss in her own terms 
(and this does not constitute communication in the rich sense), with an insane agent I 
cannot discuss at all. The way to distinguish between evil and insanity is asking the 
 
 
41 In his famous description of the beautiful soul, Hegel makes an oblique reference to the way 
Novalis died from tuberculosis, when he claims that the beautiful soul “melts into a yearning 
tubercular consumption” (PoM §668, 491). Hegel here makes a pun based on the German term for 
“consumption”, “Schwindsucht”, which is also a colloquial term for tuberculosis. Hegel thought that 
the way the Romantics lived and died reveals something about their philosophies.  
42 Enz §408, 162. 
43 Hegel only writes for an audience that accepts that contradiction is a problem. My conception of 
an insane person departs from Hegel’s more mundane conception of a ’mentally deranged‘ who still 
’has a lively feeling of the contradiction between his merely subjective presentation and objectivity. 
He is however unable to rid himself of this presentation and is fully intent either on actualizing it or 
demolishing what is actual‘ (Enz §408, 176). It seems that Hegel cannot envisage an agent who is not 
moved at all by a contradiction to adapt her views. Even the beautiful soul who ’breaks down into 
madness‘ still has ’consciousness of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy‘, which leads it 
to “give up its grim adherence to its being- for-itself (PoM §668, 491). Hegel presumably would not 
think of a person who fails to feel the pressure to resolve contradictions as an agent, since agency 
requires the capacity to plan ahead and to hold distinct views. Agents who could hold and act on 
contradictory beliefs and goals without seeing any need to be consistent in their beliefs and actions 
and who are thus unable to limit themselves to distinct beliefs and goals lack this crucial capacity.   







question: Can I latch on to something in that agent to criticise her and, if I can, could that 
criticism lead to a change of mind?44 This might not give us a sharp distinction between 
evil and insanity for all cases, but as I have pointed out, this fuzziness might be grounded 
in the very phenomenon of evil.  
(ii) In sec.III, I argued that, according to the conception of evil as a distortion of 
communication, evil and moral badness are separate phenomena. Evil is not a question of 
actions and their consequences, but of attitudes to oneself. This implies that an evil agent 
might believe that his true self is a philanthropist and spend his time volunteering for the 
needy. He might, however, also have a different, much less benevolent, conception of his 
true self, and what this conception is, is not up for rational debate. Hegel’s provocative 
notion is that there is something deeply deficient even with a self-sacrificing philanthropist 
if this ’philanthropist‘ helps others simply because he takes being a philanthropist to be his 
true self no matter what. Hegel believes that there is something fundamentally wrong with 
a person who effectively cannot be criticised from an external standpoint and who does 
not understand that an immediate and private feeling that something is true or right is 
insufficient justification for that feeling.45  
It is often assumed that if something is evil it must also be morally wrong.46 This 
is not the case for Hegel. According to his conception, evil agents might do less harm (in 
terms of consequences) than morally bad agents, and the evil agent might not be morally 
bad at all if we understand moral badness in terms of rights violations or infliction of harm. 
In fact, the evil agent might be, according to Hegel’s own paradigm, a poet, novelist and 
philosopher who is deeply dissatisfied with the human condition in the age of 
industrialization and enlightenment and who sees society as a source of alienation. One 
might object that Hegel’s account of evil does not sufficiently match our intuitions about 
who counts as evil. What I am talking about in this paper might rather capture a specific 
moral and intellectual vice but not evil.47  
 
 
44 The way to engage, and maybe even cure, an insane person is thus not through internal criticism 
but through medication and therapy that requires specialized medical and psychological training 
and expertise. 
45 Suspicion against philanthropists based on their motives is of course not restricted to Hegel. See 
Kant’s famous criticism of the ’friend of humanity‘ who helps others albeit for the wrong reasons 
and whose actions thus lack moral worth (AA IV:398-9). However, Kant, unlike Hegel, does not go 
so far as to think that this agent would be evil, at least not in a sense other than radical evil, which 
pertains to all of us (see below). Hegel would maintain that the philanthropist who is following 
nothing but her own subjectivity is still criticisable since her attitude betrays that ‘[i]t is not the thing 
which is excellent, it is I who am excellent and master of both law and thing‘ (EPR §140, 279). I cite 
Kant according to Kant (1900 ff.): AA volume:page. Translations are my own. 
46 See, for instance Formosa, ‘Evils, Wrongs and Dignity’, p. 241, who believes that a theory of evil 
and a theory of moral wrongness should be compatible in the sense that everything a theorist 
considers evil, she should also consider morally wrong. 
47 Many people in the debate argue that an agent must inflict substantial harm on others to be 
considered evil – see Kekes, Facing Evil, p. 4, John Kekes, The Roots of Evil (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), p. 1, Card, The Atrocity Paradigm, p. 3, Formosa, ‘A Conception of Evil’, 
Zachary Goldberg, ‘Evil, ‘Evil’, and Taking Responsibility’, in Wozu ist das Böse gut?, edited by Birgit 
Recki (Münster: Mentis, 2016), at pp. 17–36. Daniel Haybron, ‘Moral Monsters and Saints’, The Monist, 
85:2, pp. 260–284, at p. 264, however, argues intention or wish to do so are sufficient. An evil agent 







However, understanding evil as a distortion of communication matches at least 
some of our intuitions about evil, such as that evil is a matter of an agent’s character, that 
evil is different from moral badness, that evil agents feel no remorse, and that they are 
beyond normal forms of criticism. Furthermore, this supposed vice Hegel calls ’evil‘ is 
more fundamental than other vices since an agent in its grasp cannot be criticized by others 
in ways even morally bad agents can. This vice extends to everything the agent does and 
thinks. It is thus more than a simple vice with a specific scope (such as consumption of 
food, the correct reaction when in danger, etc.). It is, rather, an account of the possibility of 
a specific form of evil than of what we think of as evil in itself. In this Hegel’s account is 
similar to Kant who considers radical evil to be a freely chosen yet natural propensity to 
violate the moral law.48 Evil here is a condition of the possibility of moral violations and of 
moral badness. For Kant, agents could be radical evil without ever doing anything morally 
bad (such as violating other’s rights). Given human fallibility this is of course a purely 
hypothetical option, yet it is significant that evil for Kant (as well as for Hegel) does not 
necessarily imply moral badness.49 
With his provocative charge that Romanticist subjectivism is evil, Hegel aims to 
articulate the uneasiness we feel when interacting with an agent who is not susceptible to 
rational criticism in the same way that we are. Evil means that there is an essential 
randomness at the basis of agents’ deliberation. Our abilities to communicate, engage in 
rational debate, and give and demand reasons, offer no or little protection against these 
agents. We are at their mercy or at the mercy of their conceptions of themselves in a way 
that we are not with non-evil agents. When interacting with evil agents there is something 
not up for debate that should be up for debate and that must be susceptible to rational 
criticism by others. Evil agents in Hegel’s sense could easily commit evil acts as we 
ordinarily understand it. Moreover, all of them seem to have at least a latent evil to them, 
as they all take their subjectivity as overriding reason for action, and the content of their 





For Hegel evil is a relatively recent stage of human development. There was no evil in the 
pre-modern world since this period of the development of human culture lacked a notion 
of subjectivity robust enough for Romanticist subjectivism. However, once the condition 
for the possibility of evil −a fully developed subjectivity− is achieved, the possibility of evil 
will always be with us. There is however a remedy: subjectivity, in a rational modern 
society, is actualized in institutions, such as the State, art, religion, philosophy, and civil 
 
 
does not necessarily have to cause harm to anyone. Hegel’s position is even more non-standard 
insofar as his evil agent does not even need to intend to harm anyone or wish suffering upon anyone. 
I am grateful to Brian McElwee and Joe Saunders for this challenge. 
48 AA VI:32-7. 
49 The connection between evil and moral badness is, however, tighter for Kant than it is for Hegel. 
For Kant, there is still an internal connection between the concept of evil and that of moral wrongness, 
as the propensity to radical evil is precisely a propensity to prefer self-love over duty or to violate 
duty. I am grateful to Seiriol Morgan for discussion of this point. 







society. Hegel’s hope is that agents will come to realize that subjectivity is an internal and 
external actual. Subjectivity is something that modern individuals share and that enables 
them to establish a specifically modern society, a society that makes space for the 
actualization of everyone’s subjectivity. Under the right external conditions actualizing 
one’s subjectivity thus does not have to be something that requires that we turn away from 
society and from communication with other agents. 
 Hegel’s theory of evil is challenging because he does not start his theorizing from 
the usual paradigms of evil. The main weakness of this theory is that he thinks of one 
specific problem that he finds within romantic philosophy, the idea that all normative 
content is rooted in one’s authentic self and supposedly does not need further justification, 
as what evil is, regardless of how the ideal of an authentic self is actualized in an 
individual’s life. The strength of his account is that he focuses on a deficiency that tends to 
be overlooked if we only ask about harm and bad intentions: it is an essential aspect of 
human interaction that we can discuss with an open mind what others have to say and that 
others can convince us and that we can convince them. Some agents do not attach the same 
significance to this open-mindedness and some lack it entirely as well as the capability to 
critically reflect about their beliefs and to distance themselves from them. These agents 
should concern us and there is something evil about them, but this is not all there is to this 
complex phenomenon.50 
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